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ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY DISSOLVED
CORPORATIONS DURING THE STATUTORY
WINDING UP PERIOD"
CoMMoN law, having created a fictional life in corporate bodies, carried the
analogy to its logical extreme and endowed them with a fictional death upon
dissolution.' This demise left no heirs to take over the estate of the deceased:
pending suits were abated,2 debts were extinguished,' and any property
rights held by the corporation were immediately forfeited. 4 Such results
were relatively harmless at a time when the function of a corporation was
merely to enable an ecclestiastical or municipal organization 6 to hold land
* Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 218 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1949).
1. See, e.g., Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281, 286 (U.S. 1834); Greeley v.
Smith, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,748, at 1075-6 (C.C.D.Me. 1845); 8 THomPsox, Corom-
TioNs §§6505-6 (3d ed. 1927); 1 BL. Comm. *484. The common law rule persists
where no applicable statute contravenes it. See, e.g., Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937); Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273
U.S. 257, 259 (1927).
2. E.g., Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257 (1927); National Bank
v. Colby, 21 Wall. 609 (U.S. 1874). See 16 FLETCIER, CycxormA CORPORonONS
§8142 (rev. ed. 1942); WAIT, INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS §379 (1888). This rule is
now generally made obsolete by statutory provisions, but still survives in a limited
sphere through application to criminal suits. United States v. Safeway Stores, 140
F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1944) (criminal citations under Sherman Act abated by reason of
dissolution of defendant corporation). See Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations,
58 HARv. L. Rrv. 675 (1945).
3. See 16 FLrercuEa, op. cit. supra note 2, § 8127; 1 BL. Comm. *484. It is doubtful
whether this result was ever actually achieved in this country. See Marcus, supra note
2, at 677-80; BAmANTiNE, COm'ORATIONS § 312 (rev. ed. 1946). The obvious harshness
of such a rule was excused by the statement that creditors must be presumed to under-
stand the nature and incidents of the corporate body, and to contract with reference to
them. See Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281, 286 (U.S. 1834).
4. The traditional statement was that personal property escheated to the monarch,
and real property reverted to the grantor. See 1 BL. CoMm. 326-7, n.21 (Cooley's 2d ed,
1872); 8 THomPsoN, CORPORATIONS § 6506. Some commentators have insisted that this
rule was never supported by adequate authority, but has simply been handed down from
text to text as if true. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 313 (rev. ed. 1946) ; 16 Fi=Tcnimt,
op. cit. vipra note 2, § 8134; Note, 3 HARV. L. Rnv. 135 (1889). The rule has, however,
been applied in this country to non-business corporations at least. E.g., Church v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889) (church lands forfeited to the sovereign) ; Danville Seminary
v. Mott, 136 Ill. 289, 28 N.E. 54 (1891) (lands of charitable organization reverted to
donor). Material concerning the doctrine of reverter is collected in 47 A.L.R. 1288,
1328-55 (1927).
5. See Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480, 487 (U.S. 1855). One of the earliest
treatises on corporations devotes seventy pages to dissolution and its effect without
mentioning a business corporation; examples used therein range from the Order of
Templars to the City of London. 2 KYD, LAw oF CORPORATIONs 446-516 (1794). See
also Marcus, supra note 2, at 678, n. 12.
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beyond the span of an individual's lifetime.0 Since corporations then had no
stockholders, and few if any creditors, no sudden financial losses were in-
curred.Y But with the growth of a market-credit economy, corporate
wealth became embodied in extremely complex legal relationships which
could not be summarily terminated, and it became necessary to devise a
method whereby corporate assets could be translated into money and dis-
tributed to creditors and stockholders.
To meet this problem, states now have statutory provisions which endow
dissolved corporations with a life after death.9 These statutes give the trus-
tees of the corporation time in which to sue and be sued, to settle accounts
and pay off debts, to dispose of corporate property, and generally to ter-
minate the affairs of the corporation.1" During the time limit established by
6. "But, as all personal rights die vith the person; and, as the necessary forms of
investing a series of individuals, one after another, with the same identical rights, would
be very inconvenient, if not impracticable; it has been found necessary ... to constitute
artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a 1ind of legal
immortality." 1 BL Co,n'. *467.
7. See, e.g., 'Mott v. Danville Seninary, 129 Ill. 403, 410, 21 N.E. 9-7, 923 (1S9);
McAlhany v. .lurray, 89 S.C. 440, 444, 71 S.E. 1025, 1026 (1911).
8. Courts early realized the necessity of protecting creditrs, and the common law
treatment of dissolved corporations became shot through v.ith exceptions, mainly thrmugh
the interference of equity. See cases collected in 47 A.L.R. 12u3, 1355-64 (1927);
BALL_!LNrINE CosoRA rioNs -% 312-13. The device used for preservation of assets
was the concept of a trust fund for the benefit of creditors. The "trust fund" theory %as
first developed by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435, No. 17,944
(C.C.D.Me. 1824). Later this device was extended for the protection of the stoclholdcrs.
E.g., Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480 (U.S. 1855); see Folger v. Columbian Ins. Co,
99 Mass. 267, 276-7 (1868).
While the trust fund concept protected creditors and stockholders from irresponsible
dissipation of assets by giving them a cause of action against the trustees, it was not
designed to afford the trustees opportunity to take the affirmative action necessary to
achieve complete protection of parties who were still financially interested after dissolu-
tion.
9. E.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 10, § 110 (1940) (for five years, plus an additional five-
year period upon application to the court); DE.. Com, c. 65, § 42 (1935) (for three
years, plus sufficient time to resolve all litigation commenced vithin the three-year
period) ; N.Y. STocK Corp. LAw § 105 (8) (for an indefinite period); OrC. Co:ip. Lxvs
AN.. § 77-259 (Supp. 1947) (for five years with provision for e.-tensin for purpo:e of
suits involving real estate). The provisions are usually coupled with one for the ap-
pointment of a trustee to handle litigation in the name of the corporation. E.g., Rh :z.
GFN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3607 (Corrick, Supp. 1947). A few states have not e.npressly ex-
tended the corporation's existence, but have made the directors of the corporation statu-
tory trustees charged with responsibility for the assets during the winding up operation.
E.g., CoLo. STAT., c. 41, § 62 (1935). This last method constitutes codification of the
equitable trust fund doctrine. See Hornstein, Uohmtary Dissolt ion-A Now Dcvclop-
,,wnt in Intracorporate Abuse, 51 YM.ur L. J. 64, 71-5 (1941). Extensive, although
out-of-date, material on the statutory provisions of each state is collected in 47 A.L.R.
1283, 1397-1537 (1927).
10. The language of the Texas statute is typical:
"Upon the dissolution of a corporation... the president and directors... shall
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the statute, it may become financially expedient for the trustees to enforce
executory contracts and options. The disposal of property is specifically
authorized. And in Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons 11 the Texas Supreme
Court recently interpreted the state winding-up statute 12 to allow a dis-
solved corporation, even in the absence of specific authorizing language,
to acquire property by enforcing an option during the statutory period of
life after death.
In the Nardis case, the plaintiff corporation, a clothing manufacturer,
held a five-year lease on certain Dallas real estate, with an option to pur-
chase at a fixed price. At the time of dissolution, the lease had about two
and a half years to run. The trustees subsequently sought to exercise the
option, but since real estate values had risen since the signing of the lease,
the lessor refused to execute a deed. In a suit for specific performance, a
directed verdict by the trial court for the defendant lessor was affirmed by
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, principally on the theory that under
the winding up statute a dissolved corporation was wholly without power to
acquire property."3 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that the
option to purchase land was an asset within the scope of the winding up
be trustees of the creditors and stockholders of such corporation, with power to settle
the affairs, collect the outstanding debts, and divide the moneys and other property among
the stockholders after paying the debts . . .and for this purpose they may in the name
of such corporation, sell, convey and transfer all real and personal property belonging
to such company, collect all debts, compromise controversies, maintain or defend judicial
proceedings, and exercise full power and authority of said company over such assets and
property." TEx. Crv. STAT., tit. 32, art. 1388 (1925).
"The existence of every corporation may be continued for three years after its dis-
solution from whatever cause, for the purpose of enabling those charged with the duty
to settle up its affairs." Id., art. 1389.
These statutes have been interpreted to permit actions which, at first glance, seem
to have little bearing on disposal of assets in a strict sense. See, e.g., In re International
Sugar Feed Co., 23 F.Supp. 197 (D.Minn. 1938) (dissolved corporation permitted to
file petition for reorganization proceedings under § 77B of Bankruptcy Act); Bruun v.
Cook, 280 Mich. 484, 273 N.W. 774 (1937) (election of new officers) ; Tenison v. Wilson,
151 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941) (trustees allowed to organize new corporation to
take over assets of dissolved corporation).
11. 218 S.W.2d 451 (Tex: 1949).
12. TEx. Civ. STAT., tit. 32, art. 1388-9 (1925). See note 10 supra.
13. Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 213 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948). The de-
cision was partially based on the provisions of a Texas statute prohibiting a corporation
from purchasing any land unless such land is necessary to enable the corporation to do
business, or is acquired in due course of business to secure the payment of a debt. TEx.
Civ. STAT., tit. 32, art. 1359 (1925). Moreover, the court felt very strongly that the
winding up statute did not authorize a dissolved corporation to exercise an option to
buy under any circumstances:
"Thus I think the conclusion inescapable that the dissolved corporation was wholly
without power to purchase real estate, or anything else, as it was out of business, and
its trustees were not authorized in the winding-up procedure to exercise powers greater




statute. It therefore survived dissolution of the corporation, and could be
exercised if such action was necessary to settle properly the affairs of the
dissolved corporation. 4
This result gives concrete expression to the policy behind vinding up
statutes-the protection of creditors and the reimbursement of stockhold-
ers.15 Since creditors have a priority claim on the assets of the corporation,",
these statutes must, of course, be construed to favor them over stockhold-
ers.17 But where, as in this case, there is no conflict betiveen creditors and
stockholders, trustees should be permitted to reap the maximum gain for
the stockholders.' In the instant case, for example, the corporation had
gone out of business, but was still obligated to pay rent for the unexpired
term of the lease.' 9 And provisions in the lease made subletting or assign-
14. Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 218 S.V2d 451 (Te.x. 1949).
Analogous precedent affirmatively supports the Nardis decision. There has b=e no
litigation directly on the problem of 'whether a dissolved corporation can buy land under
a winding up statute. Dicta in opinions dealing 'with the question of survival of leases,
however, have indicated that options to buy, such as that in the ANardis case, survive. See
Chesnut v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.V.2d 541 (1947); Conn v. Man-
chester Amusement Co., 79 N.H. 450, 111 Atl. 339 (1920). But cf. Jackson v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 269 Fed. 598 (5th Cir. 1921).
In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. American National Red Cross, 50 ILI. 461,
149 AUt. 581 (1930), a dissolved Visiting Nurse Association, bequeathed money under
a will, was held capable of tadng possession of the money on the condition that it
manage to revive its charter before expiration of the statutory winding up period. While
that condition seems to make the holding distinguishable, this case has ben cited as
direct authority for the proposition that a corporation can acquire property after dis-
solution while acting under a winding up statute. See 16 FmrcH n, op. cit. stspra note 2,
§ 8171, n. 9; Comment, 44 Mf1icH. L. Rm. 823, 826 (1946).
15. Courts generally consider these statutes remedial in nature and construe them
liberally. See, e.g., NLRB v. Timken Silent Automatic Co, 114 F.24 449, 450 (2d Cir.
1940); Lynchburg Colliery Co. v. Gauley & B. Ry., 92 W.Va. 144, 143, 114 S.E. 462,
464 (1922). But see McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 75-6, 1C6 S.AV.2 125, 123 (1942).
16. E.g., Hunn v. United States, 60 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1932); Wilson v. Lucas, 185
Ark. 183, 47 S.W.2d 8 (1932) ; 16 FcHEP, op. cit. supra note 2, § 8219, and cases
cited therein. Such priority of claim is normally provided for e.'pressly in state statutez.
See, e.g., Texas statute, note 10 s:pra.
Creditors may hold the trustees personally liable to the e.xtent of the assets placed
in their hands if they do not properly fufill their duties. Fox v. Radel Leather Mfg. Co.,
121 N.J.Eq. 291, 189 At. 366 (CtErr.&App. 1937). Winding up statutes often ex-
pressly call for this personal liability. E.g., Trx. Civ. ST ,T., tit. 32, art. 133 (1925).
See Hornstein, supra note 10; Comment, 45 HARv. L. Rnv. 1374, 1373 (1932).
17. See Beach v. Wharton Mining Co., 123 N.J.Eq. 192, 195, 15 A.2d 605, 607
(CtErr.&App. 1940); Lyon-Gray Lumber Co. v. Gibraltar Life Ins. Co, 269 S.NV. E9,
82 (Tex.Civ.App. 1925).
18. See cases cited notes 10 and 15 supra; cf. Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 4S0
(U.S. 1885).
19. That a lease survives dissolution is settled. Perry v. Shaw, 152 Fla. 765, 13
So2d 811 (1943); Cummington Realty Associates v. Whitten, 239 Mass. 313, 132 N.E.
53 (1921); Conn v. Manchester Amusement Co., 79 N.H. 450, 111 Adt. 339 (1920).
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ment impossible.20 The option was similarly unassignable. 21 Therefore,
only by exercising the option could the trustees protect the stockholders.2"
And in view of the rise in real estate values which had occurred since the
price had been set, purchase was a prudent business move.
Consistent with the desire to protect creditors and stockholders, courts
have placed two types of restrictions on the powers of trustees acting under
a winding up statute. First, action in bad faith, designed to benefit the
trustees to the detriment of creditors and stockholders, is prohibited."
There was no question of this in the Nardis case. Second, the action must be
necessary to the winding up process.2 4 But this latter requirement has not
been so rigidly interpreted as to prevent survival of potential property
rights embodied in executory contracts.25 For instance, in Michigan an
And the duty of the corporate lessee to pay rent survives with it. People v. National
Trust Co., 82 N.Y. 283 (1880).
20. The terms of the lease are given in detail in Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons,
213 S.W.2d 864, 865-6 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948).
21. Where a lease contains a provision against assignment, an option contained in
the lease is not separable, and hence is also not assignable. Prichard v. Kimball, 190
Cal. 757, 214 Pac. 863 (1923) ; see cases cited in 38 A.L.R. 1172-3 (1925).
22. A possible alternative would be reincorporation for the purpose of holding the
lease and exercising the option. It seems probable, however, that the formation of a
new corporation for such a purpose would constitute assignment of the lease and for-
feiture of the option rights. See Gatley v. Shockley, 215 Cal. 604, 12 P.2d 436 (1932); cf.
Berrien County Fruit Exchange v. Pallas, 314 Mich. 66, 22 N.W.2d 74 (1946) (such
action permitted Where non-assignment clause had been stricken from the lease).
There was no way in which the Nardis corporation, could use the premises for busi-
ness purposes. Express prohibition against continuation of business as usual is included
in several winding up statutes. DEL. CoDE, c. 65, § 42 (1935); MAss. LAWS, c. 155, § 51
(1948) ; MicH. STAT., tit. 21, § 21.75 (1937) ; N.J. STAT. ANr. § 14:13-4 (1937). And
,where the prohibition is not express, it is implied. E.g., Houston v. Utah Lake Land,
Water & Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 Pac. 174 (1919) ; see McBride v. Clayton, 140
Tex. 71, 75-6, 166 S.V.2d 125, 128 (1942).
23. The trustees must act in good faith to benefit all the stockholders, not merely
some of them. E.g., Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50 (1890). And they may
not attempt to benefit themselves to the detriment of stockholders. E.g., Finch v. Finch,
68 Cal.App. 72, 228 Pac. 553 (1924) (trustee-stockholder accepted, in his capacity as
trustee, his own stock for cancellation, thus increasing the liability of other stockholders) ;
Young v. Blandin, 215 Minn. 111, 9 N.W.2d 313 (1943) (after liquidating assets in
lump conveyance for $5,000,000, trustee played stock market with proceeds). Nor may
they act with the purpose of benefitting stockholders at the expense of creditors. See
notes 16 and 17 sipra.
24. See McLaughlin Land & Livestock Co. v. Bank of America, 94 F.2d 491, 493
(9th Cir. 1938) ; Young v. Blandin, 215 Minn. 111, 117, 9 N.W.2d 313, 316 (1943) ; cases
cited note 22 supra.
25. Executory contracts in general survive dissolution. E.g., Mayflower Realty Co.
v. Security Savings & Loan Soc., 192 Wash. 129, 72 P.2d 1038 (1937), modified on other
grounds, 75 P.2d 579 (1938). That the contract provides for a contingent property right
seems to make no difference. See Bank of New York v. Kennedy, 183 Misc. 819, 54
N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup.Ct. 1944) (bond secured by mortgage on real estate) ; cf. Big Sespe
Oil Co. v. Cochran, 276 Fed. 216 (9th Cir. 1921) (survival of right of redemption to real
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option to renew a lease has been held enforceable after dissolution, despite
the fact that the new term extended beyond the period permitted for wind-
ing up.26 The only additional difficulty raised in the Nardis case was the
conceptual point that the trustees' action was designed to convert a po-
tential property right in'to actual "title". The problem facing the court was
a practical one: should a dissolved corporation, whose existence had been
prolonged for limited purposes by statute, be permitted to make a "windfall"
profit on an asset which had not been realized before dissolution? .' Actually,
however, no more of a "windfall" is involved in such action than in the dis-
posal of inventory stocks which have risen in price. It is clear, moreover,
that refusal to enforce the option would simply permit the lessor to escape
the consequences of a bad bargain because of the purely fortuitous dissolu-
tion of the corporate lessee.
The court in the Nardis case reached a conclusion consonant with modem
business realities. In planning ahead, a corporation must constantly make
and receive future commitments which embody within themselves profit
expectations. If these commitments are abrogated, a portion of the cor-
porate assets is effectively dissipated. By allowing a dissolved corporation
to capitalize on the agreements made during its corporate life, the Nardis
case affords creditors a fuller measure of protection and enables stockholders
to receive the fruits of their original investment.
estate); Byers v. Black Motor Co., 65 Ga.App. 773, 16 S.E2d 478 (1941) (execution of
judgment by levy on personal property).
A contract which by its terms depends on the continuing ability of the corporation
to do business, however, is extinguished upon the dissolution of the corporate party.
E.g., Arnold v. Streck, 108 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1939).
26. Kay Furniture Co. v. kovin, 312 Mich. 290, 20 N.V2d 194 (1945).
27. The intermediate appellate court, in deciding that it should not, called the trans-
action "a real estate speculation pure and simple." Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 213
SV.2d 864, 872 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948).
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